AppsFlyer’s Web SDK serves a crypto address stealer
ATG-class event9 to 11 March 2026
After what the company called a domain registrar incident, a marketing SDK loaded by customer websites served code that kept working normally while it watched for crypto wallet entries and swapped in attacker addresses.
- Position
- A marketing measurement SDK served from the vendor’s own domain
- Reach
- A segment of customer websites; AppsFlyer serves about 15,000 businesses
- Category
- Third-Party Script Injection
- Effect
- Deceive
What happened
On 9 March 2026 researchers at Profero found malicious code being served from websdk.appsflyer.com, the address from which customer sites load AppsFlyer's Web SDK for marketing measurement. AppsFlyer attributed it to a domain registrar incident that temporarily left the SDK serving unauthorized code, and said it contained the problem on 10 March. The likely exposure ran from late on 9 March to 11 March. The obfuscated code kept the SDK working normally while it hooked the browser's network requests, watched for crypto wallet entries across several chains, swapped in attacker-controlled addresses and sent the originals away.
The ATG nexus
A marketing script has no reason to touch a payment, and on most pages that load it there is no payment to touch. It loads anyway, inside the page, with the page's authority, because the site trusts the vendor's address. When the address answered with something else, every page that included it became a place where a typed wallet address could be replaced before it was used. The SDK's normal behavior continued, so nothing broke that anyone would notice.
Limits of the comparison
AppsFlyer describes the web impact as a segment of customer sites, and the full scope and root cause were not confirmed in public reporting. The swap targeted crypto addresses and nothing else on the page.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 8: Third-Party Script Loading
- Introduction: Swapping What You See
- Concept: Content Swapping
- Concept: Herd Trust
- Concept: The Static Resource Assumption