Bootcss serves a poisoned script to mobile visitors
ATG-class event20 June 2023
A year before polyfill.io, a free code-hosting service used by Chinese websites served an altered copy of a common library that sent only some mobile visitors to gambling sites. The same operator was later shown to control both services.
- Position
- A free public CDN for open-source front-end libraries
- Reach
- Sites loading libraries from cdn.bootcss.com; the payload fired for a filtered subset of mobile visitors
- Category
- CDN Compromise
- Thread
- The polyfill.io operator
What happened
BootCDN and its older address, bootcss.com, were long-standing free services that hosted copies of popular open-source libraries for Chinese developers. In 2023 the services changed hands. From about 20 June 2023, developers on Chinese forums reported that a copy of the highlight.js library served from cdn.bootcss.com carried extra code. For most visitors the file behaved normally. For visitors on mobile devices arriving from particular referring pages, it fetched a second script that redirected them to gambling sites.
The episode drew little attention outside those forums at the time. It came back into view in June 2024, when BleepingComputer found forum pages from that week describing a primitive version of the code later found in polyfill.io, and Censys reported bootcss.com as the one domain in the group with signs of malice before 2024. In 2026, QiAnXin XLab wrote that the loader code in the operator's later campaigns matched the 2023 BootCDN incident.
The ATG nexus
The position was bought rather than broken into, and the change arrived through the same address every dependent site already trusted. Nothing about the request a page made, or the response it received, would look different to the site's owner. The payload decided at run time who would see it: mobile, a chosen referrer, and nothing for a desktop browser where a developer might be looking. That is the selective, per-request behaviour the research describes, run on a population of sites that had no reason to look.
It is also the first dated appearance of an operator that went on to hold polyfill.io, a CDN control-plane product and a CMS update channel. Seen on its own it is a small redirect campaign. Seen in sequence it is the rehearsal.
Limits of the comparison
The link from this incident to the later operator rests on code similarity and on the shared account exposed in June 2024, reported by researchers rather than by any official finding. The payload redirected visitors to other sites, which is visible to the person it hits. It did not alter what a trusted page said.
On this site
- Whitepaper 7.3: The CDN Acquisition Attack Model
- Introduction: Buying a Position of Trust
- Concept: Supply Chain Injection
- Concept: The Silent Transfer
- Concept: The Static Resource Assumption
Sources
- Polyfill.io, BootCDN, Bootcss, Staticfile attack traced to 1 operator
- RingH23 Threat Actors Target MacCMS and CDN Infrastructure with New Arsenal (reporting QiAnXin XLab research)
- Community report of the poisoned bootcss highlight.js file (Chinese)
- Polyfill.io Supply Chain Attack: Digging into the Web of Compromised Domains