A tampered wallet interface lets attackers take $1.5 billion from Bybit
ATG-class event21 February 2025
JavaScript served from a wallet provider’s cloud storage showed Bybit’s signers a routine transfer while they approved one that handed control of a cold wallet to the attacker. About $1.5 billion was taken. It is the largest theft in the public record built on altering what a screen showed.
- Position
- The hosted front-end code of the multisig wallet interface Bybit used
- Reach
- One target: the code altered transactions only for Bybit’s wallet contract
- Category
- Third-Party Script Injection
- Effect
- Deceive
What happened
Bybit moved funds from an Ethereum cold wallet using Safe{Wallet}, a multisignature wallet interface. On 21 February 2025, during a routine transfer, the signers approved a transaction that replaced the wallet's logic and gave the attacker control. More than 400,000 ETH and stETH, about $1.5 billion, left the wallet.
Sygnia, investigating for Bybit, found malicious JavaScript served from Safe's AWS storage, modified about two days before the theft. It changed transactions only for Bybit's contract address, and clean files were put back about two minutes after the theft. Safe and Mandiant later reported that a Safe developer's laptop had been compromised on 4 February through a malicious Docker project, and that the attackers used the developer's AWS session to modify the hosted files. The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea on 26 February.
The ATG nexus
This is the plainest public case of Content Swapping. The signers were experienced people following a procedure with several approvals, which is exactly the control a multisig exists to provide. Every one of them looked at a screen that showed the transfer they expected. The screen was the thing that had been changed. The interface came from a supplier, was assembled in the signers' browsers at the moment of use, and was changed for one customer only, so every other user of the same service saw normal behavior.
Then the attackers restored the clean files. Had the funds not moved on chain, there would have been little to show what the signers had seen. That is the Forensic Blindspot.
Limits of the comparison
The theft left a public blockchain record, which an altered news page or dashboard would not. Safe's smart contracts and source code were not compromised, and Bybit's own systems were not found to be breached.
On this site
- Introduction: Swapping What You See
- Introduction: Aimed at You
- Introduction: No Trace and No Proof
- Whitepaper, Chapter 8: Third-Party Script Loading
- Concept: Content Swapping
- Concept: Post-Load / Post-Trust Modification
- Concept: The Forensic Blindspot
- Concept: The Detection Blindspot