Vendor code on Polymarket’s front end runs approval phishing
ATG-class event25 June 2026
Polymarket disclosed that a compromised third-party vendor had injected code into its web front end, which led users through an approval flow inside the genuine interface. About $3 million was reported stolen.
- Position
- A third-party vendor’s code loaded by the platform’s front end
- Reach
- Users of the web front end during the exposure
- Category
- Third-Party Script Injection
- Effect
- Deceive
What happened
On 25 June 2026 Polymarket, a prediction market, disclosed a front-end supply-chain attack attributed to a compromised third-party vendor. Malicious code injected into the site's front end presented users with approval requests inside the platform's genuine interface, and users who approved them lost funds. About $3 million was reported stolen. The vendor was not named in the reporting retrieved for this page.
The ATG nexus
The user was on the real site, at the real address, using the real interface, and the request on the screen came from code the site had chosen to load. Nothing a user could check from the address bar would have shown a problem. Four months later the same platform was hit again through a different vendor, which says something about how hard this exposure is to close once a site depends on outside code.
Limits of the comparison
Public detail on this incident is thin, and the vendor and mechanism were not identified in the sources retrieved. Users still had to approve the requests.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 8: Third-Party Script Loading
- Introduction: Swapping What You See
- Concept: Content Swapping
- Concept: Integration on the Glass