Attackers drive operators’ screens to cut power in Ukraine

Why the screen matters23 December 2015

Intruders used three regional utilities’ own control workstations to open breakers, leaving about 225,000 customers without power while operators watched their cursors move.

Position
Remote access to utilities’ control workstations
Effect
Destroy

What happened

On the afternoon of 23 December 2015, attackers used stolen credentials and remote access to take over operator workstations at three Ukrainian regional power distribution companies and open breakers. Operators were locked out and watched their mouse cursors move as the intruders clicked. About 225,000 customers lost power for one to six hours. To slow recovery the attackers loaded malicious firmware onto network gateways, disconnected backup power, wiped systems and flooded the call center. The initial foothold came from phishing emails; the outage itself came from direct manipulation of the control systems. The attack is attributed to the Russian group Sandworm.

The ATG nexus

Not a supply-chain event. It shows the Destroy effect in its purest form: the operators' own screens, with their authority, were the means of damage. In the research's terms the harm went through the Glass rather than appearing on it.

Limits of the comparison

The operators could see what was happening, so it was not deceptive. The position came from stolen credentials, not a supplier.

On this site

Sources

  1. Analysis of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Power Grid: Defense Use CaseE-ISAC and SANS ICS, 18 March 2016Primary source
  2. IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01: Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical InfrastructureCISA / ICS-CERT, 25 February 2016Primary source
  3. Ukraine power outages caused by cyberattacks affected 225,000 customers, says USInternational Business Times UK, February 2016

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