A backdoor in xz Utils is caught weeks before wide release
Large-scale supply chain: attack29 March 2024
A compression library present in most Linux systems carried a backdoor that could reach the SSH server, planted by a contributor who had spent years earning maintainer trust. An engineer noticed a half-second slowdown and found it.
- Position
- Maintainer trust in a core open-source library
- Reach
- Mostly pre-release and rolling distributions; caught before stable releases
- Category
- Open-Source Maintainer Infiltration
What happened
On 29 March 2024 Andres Freund, a software engineer, posted that the upstream xz and liblzma releases 5.6.0 and 5.6.1 contained a backdoor that could compromise the SSH server on systems where it was linked in. He had noticed SSH logins using unusual CPU time and taking about half a second longer. The malicious code was in the release tarballs, with obfuscated test files committed to the repository. CISA advised downgrading. Because the versions had not yet reached most stable distributions, the backdoor was caught before wide deployment.
The ATG nexus
The confirmed record cites xz for the pathway, not for its reach to the screen: a contributor who arrived as a helper, took on maintenance of an under-resourced project, and used that trust to ship a backdoor. Patient, legitimate, and very nearly successful. The same pathway is open for any package that ships in client bundles.
Limits of the comparison
xz is a server-side systems library. It was found by chance, before it reached most stable releases.
On this site
- Introduction: Getting Into Position
- Whitepaper, Chapter 9: Open Source and the Path to the Client Runtime
- Whitepaper, Chapter 13: The Confirmed Historical Record
- Concept: The Open-Source Open Door
- Concept: Lying in Wait
- Concept: The Cost of Free