Banking trojans rewrite bank pages inside victims’ browsers
Why the screen mattersc. 2007 to 2012
Zeus and SpyEye stole online-banking credentials with web injects that rewrote bank pages in the victim’s own browser, and later hid fraudulent transactions and adjusted the displayed balance.
- Position
- Malware on the victim’s own computer
- Effect
- Deceive
What happened
The Zeus banking trojan, and later SpyEye, which merged with it in 2010, infected PCs and used web injects to rewrite bank pages inside the victim's browser, adding fields to capture credentials and account details. In 2012 Trusteer reported that SpyEye also hid fraud: when a victim logged back in, it removed the fraudulent transactions from the page and showed an adjusted balance. In 2010 the FBI announced that one Zeus ring had stolen $70 million from US accounts. SpyEye's author was sentenced in 2016; the Justice Department said the malware infected more than 50 million computers.
The ATG nexus
The precedent for Content Swapping. A real bank page, from the real bank, arrived at the browser and was changed before the customer saw it, so the customer saw the balance the criminal chose. The difference is the position. Zeus needed malware on each victim's machine, which antivirus could find. ATG reaches the same effect from a trusted supplier's position, with nothing installed on the device at all.
Limits of the comparison
These were infections of individual computers, detectable on the device. The $70 million figure belongs to one Zeus ring, not to SpyEye.
On this site
- Introduction: Swapping What You See
- Whitepaper, Chapter 13: The Confirmed Historical Record
- Concept: Content Swapping