Altered Brevo scripts reach more than 100,000 sites in four hours

ATG-class event14 September 2026

For about four hours, the tracker and chat scripts that a marketing platform serves to its customers’ sites carried extra code. Logged-in WordPress administrators had a plugin installed through their own session, and other visitors saw a fake verification prompt that asked them to run a command.

Position
Tracker and chat-widget scripts served from the vendor’s CDN, altered at the CDN edge
Reach
More than 100,000 customer sites (Sansec); active for about four hours
Category
Third-Party Script Injection
Effect
Deceive, Destroy

What happened

Brevo is an email and marketing platform. Its customers embed two of its scripts on their own sites: a tracker, sdk-loader.js, and a chat widget, brevo-conversations.js. Sansec observed the last clean copy of the tracker at 16:04 UTC on 14 September 2026 and an altered copy less than a minute later. The altered files loaded further code from lookalike subdomains of a domain Brevo itself operates. Brevo's own pages, its hosted signup and unsubscribe forms and its booking pages carried the same code. The last activity Sansec recorded was at 20:12 UTC, and the attacker's hosts stopped resolving the next day.

The code did one of two things. If the visitor was logged in to WordPress as an administrator, it used that session to install a plugin from the attacker's server. Other visitors saw an overlay asking them to prove they were human by copying and running a command, which was placed on their clipboard. Crawlers, developers and automated scanners received nothing.

Sansec put the reach at more than 100,000 customer sites. The Cloud Security Alliance's note relays Brevo's account of the cause: a Cloudflare API key with full account permissions, stored in application source code, was used to deploy a Cloudflare Worker that changed responses at the CDN edge. Brevo's origin servers were not changed, so the files there looked normal throughout.

The ATG nexus

The scripts kept their addresses, and the sites that loaded them changed nothing. The alteration was made at the edge, between the vendor's clean origin and the visitor, which is the point the research describes: what the origin holds and what a given person receives are different things, and only the second one runs.

The code also chose by visitor. An administrator's session was used as the tool, which is Conscripted Trust, and everyone else was shown something the site never wrote. Scanners were shown nothing at all, so a site owner checking the script would have found it clean.

This is the second case of the pattern in three months. The OptinMonster incident in June 2026 used a vendor script and an administrator's session in the same way.

Limits of the comparison

Both payloads were loud. A fake verification prompt is visible, and an installed plugin leaves a record on the server. Sansec did not recover the plugin itself, and no figure has been published for how many administrators or visitors were affected. The account of the cause is Brevo's, as relayed by others, and Brevo had not published a full report when this page was written.

On this site

Sources

  1. Brevo supply chain attack hits 100k+ sites with Wordpress backdoors and Clickfix malwareSansec, 16 September 2026Primary source
  2. Brevo Breach: Stolen API Key Poisons 100,000+ WebsitesCloud Security Alliance, 21 September 2026

Back to this event on the timeline