An analytics script profiles visitors and serves phone exploits
ATG-class event27 August to 3 September 2026
Code injected into a web analytics service’s script profiled each visitor’s phone on the sites that used it and served platform-specific exploit chains to chosen iOS and Android devices. Researchers linked the operators to APT29.
- Position
- The main script of a third-party web analytics service
- Reach
- Sites using the service, including a trade association, a political party and a military-related site; exploits for selected mobile visitors
- Category
- Third-Party Script Injection
What happened
Researchers at Sekoia found, in mid-October 2026, that malicious code had been injected into main.js, the script of the Plerdy web analytics service, between 27 August and 3 September 2026. Sites that loaded it included a US chemical industry trade association, a European political party and a Bulgarian military-related site, alongside lookalike domains imitating sites in several countries. The code profiled each visitor's device. Selected iOS and Android visitors received exploit chains matched to their operating system and browser versions, which stole cookies, device data, or browser data and Wi-Fi passwords. Sekoia named the activity Poisoned Source, and The Hacker News described the operators as linked to APT29.
The ATG nexus
An analytics script exists to learn about each visitor, so profiling is its normal behavior. The attackers used that position to decide, visitor by visitor, who received an exploit. Everyone else got ordinary analytics. The sites that hosted the script were chosen for their readers, which is targeting by audience: reach the people who read a particular trade body, party or military site, through code those sites trusted.
As with AdFection, the payload was loud. Exploit chains leave artifacts on devices, and that is how such operations are found. The same position could have changed what those readers saw and left nothing.
Limits of the comparison
The account comes from one research team, reported through the press. The exploits needed vulnerabilities in the devices themselves, which the script position does not provide.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 8: Third-Party Script Loading
- Introduction: Aimed at You
- Introduction: Anyone in Position
- Concept: Supply Chain Injection
- Concept: The Detection Blindspot
- Concept: Conscripted Trust