Expired tag domains become a delivery network for phone spyware

ATG-class event22 October 2026

Researchers described an operator that buys expired domains which websites still load old analytics, advertising and widget tags from. A server then decides, visitor by visitor, what each person is sent, including exploit kits for iPhones. No website was broken into.

Position
Expired domains behind third-party tags that sites never removed
Reach
More than 660 domains on thousands of sites; an estimated 135 million visits a month (Report URI)
Category
Third-Party Script Injection

What happened

On 22 October 2026 Report URI, working with the mobile security firm iVerify, described an operation it named DeadTag. Websites often keep loading a script from a service long after that service has closed. When the service's domain expires, anyone can register it. The DeadTag operator buys such domains as they come back on sale, and from then on every site still carrying the old tag loads the operator's code. Report URI counted more than 660 domains used this way, embedded on thousands of sites, and cautiously estimated 135 million visits a month.

The script the operator serves is about 2 KB. A server decides for each visitor whether to send them elsewhere. Search engines, security scanners and requests from data-center addresses got nothing, so the researchers had to use residential connections to see it. Visitors who were selected went to whoever was buying that traffic: fake prize pages, betting sign-ups, and an exploit kit for iPhones. The kit carried two toolsets covering different iOS versions, needed no click, and stole saved passwords and cryptocurrency wallet data.

Report URI found nothing that identifies the DeadTag operator and describes it as a commercial traffic business. On 6 November its founder wrote that the firm had confirmed 15,579 sites running malicious JavaScript from all causes, this one among them, and had no workable way to tell most of the owners.

The ATG nexus

This is The Silent Transfer without a sale. Control of a trusted address passed to a new owner, and the sites that depended on it were never told, because nobody is told when a domain lapses. The tag on each site did not change. What answered it did.

The delivery is selective by design. One server chooses per visitor, and the people most likely to investigate are the ones it declines to answer. The site owner, the scanner and most visitors see a page working normally.

It also shows how a position is rented out. The operator holds the addresses and sells what passes through them, and the buyer chooses the payload.

Limits of the comparison

What the buyers delivered was loud: redirects a person can see, and exploits that leave traces on a device. The traffic figure is Report URI's estimate, and the account comes from one research partnership. The exploit kits needed flaws in the phones themselves, which the position does not supply.

On this site

Sources

  1. DeadTag: how forgotten website tags became a delivery network for iPhone spywareReport URI, 22 October 2026Primary source
  2. We Know 15,579 Websites Are Infected. How Do We Tell Them?Scott Helme, 6 November 2026Primary source

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