A skimmer in one analytics script reaches every checkout on a store platform

ATG-class event24 to 27 October 2026

A Brazilian e-commerce platform serves one analytics script to every store it runs. For about three days that script carried a card skimmer that woke only on checkout pages and sent payment details to the attacker.

Position
A self-hosted analytics script loaded by every merchant on the platform
Reach
The checkouts of dozens of Brazilian fashion brands; no count of affected shoppers published
Category
Third-Party Script Injection
Effect
Deceive

What happened

Convertr runs online stores and their checkout for dozens of Brazilian fashion brands. Every store loads a tracking script from Convertr's own copy of Plausible, an open-source analytics product. Sansec saw the last clean copy of that script at 05:03 UTC on 24 October 2026 and detected a skimmer in it later the same day. The added code followed the normal analytics script in the same file. It did nothing on ordinary pages. On checkout pages it read the card number, expiry date, security code, cardholder name and Brazilian taxpayer number, and sent them to a server the attacker controlled.

On 26 October the attacker replaced the first version with one written for the exact field names of Convertr's payment system. Convertr reported the skimmer removed on 27 October, and Sansec confirmed the script was clean that afternoon. Sansec attributes the attack to a Brazilian group it has tracked since 2024, and notes that Convertr's copy of Plausible was a version with a known flaw that had been fixed in May. It could not confirm that the flaw was the way in.

The ATG nexus

One file, written by nobody at any of the stores, ran inside every checkout on the platform. The stores had not changed, the payment pages had not changed, and the analytics kept working. The same pattern appears in the confirmed record for Ticketmaster and British Airways in 2018. Eight years later it still works, on a platform small enough that one research firm reported it.

The second version is worth noting. The attacker watched the first one run, then tuned the code to this platform's own payment calls. A position inside the page lets its holder learn the application from the inside.

Limits of the comparison

This is theft of what the shopper typed, not a change to what the shopper saw. Sansec published no count of affected stores or cards, and a single research firm is the only source.

On this site

Sources

  1. Notorious Brazilian Magecart group hijacks Convertr checkouts via outdated Plausible installSansec, 26 October 2026Primary source

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