A hijacked performance script drains Polymarket traders in an hour
ATG-class event29 October 2026
Attackers hijacked a performance-monitoring vendor’s DNS at its registrar and served malicious code in place of its script. Running in signed-in traders’ pages, the code moved or sold their positions, taking about $2.7 million from 726 wallets in about an hour.
- Position
- A real-user monitoring script, through the vendor’s DNS records
- Reach
- 726 wallets drained; about 5,500 more affected during the trading pause
- Category
- Third-Party Script Injection
- Effect
- Destroy
What happened
Polymarket loaded a page-speed script from DebugBear, a real-user monitoring service. On 29 October 2026 DebugBear's DNS records were changed through its domain registrar, and a different server answered for its addresses, serving malicious code in place of the script. DebugBear reported no break-in to its own systems. The code ran in signed-in traders' open pages. It read stored account details, including trading API keys, found the site's order-placing code and its transaction signer, and used them. For wallet-login accounts it moved positions to the attacker's wallet. For email-login accounts it sold positions at worsening prices and moved the funds out. About $2.7 million left 726 wallets between 17:10 and 18:02 UTC. Polymarket paused its exchange at 18:05, removed the script within the hour, and is returning $3.9 million in total, including to about 5,500 wallets affected by the pause.
The ATG nexus
A monitoring script, loaded to measure how fast pages render, sat inside a trading application with access to everything the application held. The attacker never touched Polymarket or the vendor's servers. Holding the vendor's name in DNS was enough. The code then acted with each trader's own authority, using the site's own functions, so every order looked like the trader's. That is Destroy by the corpus definition, and Conscripted Trust in practice: the user's session became the weapon.
It also shows how fast a position can pay. The first stolen funds arrived within minutes of the swap, and the theft was over before the platform could stop trading.
Limits of the comparison
The harm was financial and on chain, so it was recorded. The trading pause and the vendor's DNS change gave investigators fixed points that a quieter operation would not.
On this site
- Introduction: Deceive, Disrupt, Degrade, Deny, Destroy
- Whitepaper, Chapter 8: Third-Party Script Loading
- Whitepaper, Chapter 14: Existing Defenses
- Concept: Conscripted Trust
- Concept: Supply Chain Injection
- Concept: Herd Trust
- Concept: The Detection Blindspot
Sources
- Hackers steal about $2.7 million from Polymarket traders via hijacked DebugBear script
- Polymarket halts trading after crypto-draining script breach
- Hackers Hijacked DebugBear’s DNS To Serve Malicious JavaScript
- Polymarket paused international trading after a security issue involving a third-party provider