A hacked certificate authority issues a fake Google certificate
Placement and access17 June 2011 to September 2011
An intruder in a Dutch certificate authority issued 531 rogue certificates, one of them for Google, which was used to intercept Gmail connections from about 300,000 IP addresses, most of them in Iran.
- Position
- A trusted certificate authority
- Reach
- About 298,000 unique IP addresses in the authority’s logs, about 99 percent in Iran
What happened
An intruder entered the network of DigiNotar, a Dutch certificate authority that also issued Dutch government certificates, on 17 June 2011. From 10 July it issued 531 rogue certificates, including one for Google domains. That certificate let whoever held it impersonate Google's services, and it was used to intercept Gmail and other Google connections. DigiNotar's certificate-status logs recorded requests from 298,140 unique IP addresses, about 99 percent of them in Iran. Google reported the attacks on 29 August; Chrome had detected the fraudulent certificate. Browsers removed trust in DigiNotar, the Dutch government withdrew its own trust, and the company went bankrupt in September 2011.
The ATG nexus
Encryption tells a browser it is talking to the right party only because a certificate authority says so. Whoever controls an authority can make an interception look like a secure connection. That places a certificate authority near the top of the research's levels of control: one position that underwrites trust for everyone. Interception is the precondition for substituting content on the path.
Limits of the comparison
The certificate was used to read traffic, and no altered content on screen was documented. The 300,000 figure counts addresses in logs, not confirmed victims, and the attack was not formally attributed.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 11: Placement and Access
- Whitepaper, Chapter 14: Existing Defenses
- Concept: No Network Is Structurally Immune
- Concept: Herd Trust