Stuxnet replays normal readings while it damages centrifuges
Why the screen matters17 June 2010
Malware that targeted the controllers of Iranian uranium centrifuges recorded normal sensor values and replayed them to operators while it manipulated the process. It is widely reported to have destroyed up to 1,000 centrifuges.
- Position
- Malware inside industrial controllers
- Effect
- Deceive, Destroy
What happened
Stuxnet was first reported in June 2010, though samples show it was active at least a year earlier. It used four Windows zero-day exploits to reach Siemens controllers that ran the frequency converters driving centrifuge motors. Symantec documented a routine that pushed centrifuge speeds far above and below their normal range. Ralph Langner documented an earlier routine that recorded 21 seconds of sensor values and replayed them in a loop during the attack, so operators' screens showed normal readings while the process was being manipulated. The Institute for Science and International Security estimated up to 1,000 centrifuges were destroyed at Natanz. No government has officially claimed it.
The ATG nexus
Not a supply-chain event. It is here because it is the best-documented case of a screen deceiving operators in order to cause physical damage, the boundary case where Deceive and Destroy meet. The people watching the screen were told everything was fine, and they had no other way to know.
Limits of the comparison
Stuxnet required a long, expensive campaign to place malware inside specific industrial equipment. Its authorship is widely reported, not officially confirmed.
On this site
- Introduction: Deceive, Disrupt, Degrade, Deny, Destroy
- Concept: The Glass Beyond the Browser
- Concept: Data as Code