The Great Cannon swaps scripts on the wire

ATG-class event16 March to 8 April 2015

A system on Chinese backbone links replaced some unencrypted requests for Baidu analytics and ad scripts with a script that turned visitors’ browsers against GreatFire.org and GitHub. It is the confirmed example of injection from the network path.

Position
In-path on national backbone links, between users and Baidu’s servers
Reach
About 1.75 percent of matching requests in one test, from visitors worldwide
Category
Network-Position Injection

What happened

From 16 March 2015, GreatFire.org, which runs mirrors of sites censored in China, came under a large traffic flood. On 26 March the flood turned to two GitHub pages run by the same group. Citizen Lab, with researchers from ICSI and UC Berkeley, traced it to a system they named the Great Cannon. It sat on the same links as the Great Firewall but was a distinct system. For some unencrypted requests to Baidu servers hosting analytics, social and advertising scripts, it dropped the request and answered in Baidu's place with a malicious script. That script made the visitor's browser repeatedly request resources from the targets.

The swap was selective: in one test, 526 of 30,000 requests, about 1.75 percent, were replaced. Baidu's own servers were not shown to be compromised. The researchers recommended HTTPS as the main defense.

The ATG nexus

Every page that loaded a Baidu script trusted that script because of where it came from. The Great Cannon never touched Baidu or the sites. It held the path, and that was enough to substitute what arrived. The visitors' browsers then did the work, with no one at either end aware of it. The research files this as the one ATG-class category whose position is not a supply-chain position at all: controlling the path is sufficient without controlling any component.

The payload here was a flood aimed at third parties. The researchers noted the same capability could serve exploits, or anything else, to chosen visitors.

Limits of the comparison

The resources were served over plain HTTP, and encryption would have stopped this form of substitution. The position is still reachable by other routes: route and DNS hijacks, certificate-authority compromise, or any operator of a transit link or middlebox.

On this site

Sources

  1. China's Great CannonCitizen Lab, University of Toronto, 10 April 2015Primary source
  2. Don't Be Fodder for China's 'Great Cannon'Krebs on Security, 10 April 2015
  3. China's Great CannonSchneier on Security, April 2015

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