Preinstalled adware breaks HTTPS to inject ads into pages
Placement and access19 February 2015
Lenovo laptops shipped with adware that installed its own root certificate to inject ads into encrypted web pages, with a private key anyone could extract, exposing every affected user to interception.
- Position
- Software preinstalled by the device manufacturer
- Reach
- About 750,000 laptops in the US (press reporting)
What happened
From late 2014 Lenovo preinstalled Superfish's VisualDiscovery adware on consumer laptops. It injected product ads into web pages, including encrypted ones. To reach inside HTTPS pages it installed its own root certificate and re-signed sites' certificates, acting as a man in the middle on the user's own machine. In February 2015 a researcher extracted the private key, protected by the same easily cracked password on every laptop, which meant anyone could impersonate secure sites to affected users. Lenovo stopped shipping it and published removal tools. In 2017 it settled with the FTC and 32 states, paying $3.5 million to the states and agreeing to a long-term software security program.
The ATG nexus
The manufacturer's position on the device came before anything the user installed or any site they visited. From there, third-party code rewrote the pages people read, and did it inside connections the browser reported as secure. The case is a precursor in two ways: content injected into pages from a trusted position, and a defense, encryption, silently bypassed by the party the user had no reason to doubt.
Limits of the comparison
The injected content was advertising, visible as such. The danger to users came from the weak key, which exposed them to others, rather than from deliberate deception by the vendor.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 14: Existing Defenses
- Concept: The Glass Beyond the Browser
- Concept: Integration on the Glass