Eight lines of skimmer code on Newegg’s checkout

ATG-class event14 August to 18 September 2018

For about five weeks, injected code on Newegg’s checkout page sent the payment details of desktop and mobile shoppers to a lookalike domain registered the day before the attack began.

Position
Script injected into the retailer’s own checkout page
Reach
A site with more than 50 million monthly visitors; victims not disclosed
Category
Third-Party Script Injection

What happened

From 14 August to 18 September 2018, Newegg's billing page carried injected code that captured the payment form when a customer pressed the checkout button and sent it to neweggstats.com. That domain had been registered on 13 August with a domain-validated certificate. Volexity measured the skimmer at eight lines, smaller than the British Airways code, and found that it worked for desktop and mobile customers alike. RiskIQ and Volexity found it, and Newegg removed it on 18 September. The number of victims was not disclosed.

The ATG nexus

A handful of lines placed on the right page are enough, because the page has already collected what the attacker wants and the customer has already decided to trust it. The lookalike domain gave the outgoing request a name that blended with the retailer's own. Newegg and British Airways, weeks apart, show the Magecart pattern the confirmed record describes: the shape recurs, and only the target changes.

Limits of the comparison

This was code placed on Newegg's own server, so the position was a breach of the site rather than a supplier. Nothing on the screen was altered, and no victim count exists.

On this site

Sources

  1. Magecart Strikes Again, Siphoning Payment Info from NeweggThreatpost, 20 September 2018
  2. 'Magecart' Card-Sniffing Gang Cracks NeweggBankInfoSecurity, 20 September 2018
  3. Case Study: NeweggReport URI (vendor)

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