Eight lines of skimmer code on Newegg’s checkout
ATG-class event14 August to 18 September 2018
For about five weeks, injected code on Newegg’s checkout page sent the payment details of desktop and mobile shoppers to a lookalike domain registered the day before the attack began.
- Position
- Script injected into the retailer’s own checkout page
- Reach
- A site with more than 50 million monthly visitors; victims not disclosed
- Category
- Third-Party Script Injection
What happened
From 14 August to 18 September 2018, Newegg's billing page carried injected code that captured the payment form when a customer pressed the checkout button and sent it to neweggstats.com. That domain had been registered on 13 August with a domain-validated certificate. Volexity measured the skimmer at eight lines, smaller than the British Airways code, and found that it worked for desktop and mobile customers alike. RiskIQ and Volexity found it, and Newegg removed it on 18 September. The number of victims was not disclosed.
The ATG nexus
A handful of lines placed on the right page are enough, because the page has already collected what the attacker wants and the customer has already decided to trust it. The lookalike domain gave the outgoing request a name that blended with the retailer's own. Newegg and British Airways, weeks apart, show the Magecart pattern the confirmed record describes: the shape recurs, and only the target changes.
Limits of the comparison
This was code placed on Newegg's own server, so the position was a breach of the site rather than a supplier. Nothing on the screen was altered, and no victim count exists.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 8: Third-Party Script Loading
- Whitepaper, Chapter 13: The Confirmed Historical Record
- Concept: Runtime Anarchy
- Concept: Origin Laundering