A modified script on British Airways skims card details
ATG-class event22 June to 5 September 2018
Twenty-two added lines in a copy of a common JavaScript library on British Airways’ site and app sent customers’ payment details to a lookalike domain for over two weeks. The regulator found about 429,612 customers and staff affected.
- Position
- A copy of a widely used library served from the airline’s own site
- Reach
- About 429,612 customers and staff (ICO); first reported as about 380,000 card payments
- Category
- Third-Party Script Injection
What happened
Attackers gained access to British Airways systems from 22 June 2018. From 21 August to 5 September they diverted payment data by modifying the copy of the Modernizr library that BA's website and app loaded. RiskIQ found 22 added lines that captured the payment form fields and the cardholder's name when the customer pressed submit, and sent them to baways.com, a lookalike domain with a valid certificate. BA did not detect it; a third party alerted the airline on 5 September.
The UK Information Commissioner's Office later found about 429,612 customers and staff affected, 244,000 of them with name, address, card number and security code. It fined BA £20 million in October 2020, down from a proposed figure of about £183 million.
The ATG nexus
The library was a standard, widely used piece of open-source code. The site served its own copy, so the altered file arrived from the airline's own address and carried the airline's own trust. A lookalike domain received the data, so outgoing traffic looked plausible at a glance. The case shows how little code an operation needs once it runs inside the page: the page had already gathered everything worth taking.
Limits of the comparison
The attackers got in by compromising BA's systems, so this is a breach of the site that used a library as its hiding place. The screen itself was not changed. The 380,000 and 429,612 figures are different counts made at different times.
On this site
- Introduction: A Supply Chain Nobody Sees
- Whitepaper, Chapter 8: Third-Party Script Loading
- Whitepaper, Chapter 13: The Confirmed Historical Record
- Concept: Runtime Anarchy
- Concept: Origin Laundering
- Concept: Supply Chain Injection