ASUS Live Update backdoor targets about 600 machines
Placement and accessJune to November 2018
A trojanized version of ASUS’s own update utility, signed with ASUS certificates and pushed from its servers, reached hundreds of thousands of PCs but activated only on machines whose network addresses were on a hard-coded list.
- Position
- The manufacturer’s update servers and code-signing certificates
- Reach
- More than 57,000 Kaspersky users; estimated more than 1 million worldwide; about 600 targeted MAC addresses
What happened
From June to November 2018, a trojanized ASUS Live Update utility, signed with legitimate ASUSTeK certificates, was distributed from ASUS's own update servers. On most machines it did nothing visible. It checked each PC's network adapter MAC addresses against a list built into the code and fetched a second stage only for a match. Kaspersky extracted more than 600 unique addresses from over 200 samples, counted more than 57,000 of its own users with the utility, and estimated more than a million affected worldwide. Kaspersky reported it to ASUS in January 2019 and published in March. ASUS released a fixed version.
The ATG nexus
A hardware maker's update channel is trusted absolutely by the machines it ships. The operation used it to deliver to everyone and act on a list. For every user not on the list, the update behaved normally, and an investigator examining their machine would find little. The case is among the clearest public examples of precision targeting through a trusted position: the population that received the code and the population it was meant for were different by three orders of magnitude.
Limits of the comparison
This was a desktop backdoor, and the targets were selected by hardware identifiers rather than by what they read. Attribution was suggested by code links, not firmly established.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 11: Placement and Access
- Introduction: Aimed at You
- Concept: Supply Chain Injection
- Concept: Lying in Wait