A route hijack serves a fake MyEtherWallet
ATG-class event24 April 2018
For about two hours, hijacked internet routes sent DNS queries for a popular crypto wallet site to a rogue server, which pointed users to a phishing copy. About 215 ETH was taken.
- Position
- Internet routing to Amazon Route 53’s DNS addresses
- Reach
- Users whose DNS lookups crossed the hijacked routes
- Category
- Network-Position Injection
- Effect
- Deceive
What happened
On 24 April 2018 an Ohio network announced more specific routes for part of the address space used by Amazon's Route 53 DNS service. The announcements spread through peers, and for about two hours some DNS queries for myetherwallet.com went to a rogue server, which answered with the address of a phishing copy of the site hosted in Russia. Users who reached it and entered their wallet keys lost their funds. About 215 ETH, then roughly $150,000 to $160,000, was collected.
The fake site used a self-signed certificate, so browsers showed a warning. Amazon said neither AWS nor Route 53 was hacked, and MyEtherWallet said its own platform was not breached.
The ATG nexus
The user typed the right name and reached the wrong place. Nothing at the wallet service or at Amazon was altered. The attacker held a position in routing, below DNS and below the web, and from there decided what the name resolved to. The research lists route and DNS hijacks among the ways to hold the network path without controlling any component.
Limits of the comparison
The certificate warning was the visible tell, and users who heeded it were safe. The attack substituted a whole site, which is cruder than altering content inside a genuine one.
On this site
- Whitepaper, Chapter 13: The Confirmed Historical Record
- Whitepaper, Chapter 14: Existing Defenses
- Concept: No Network Is Structurally Immune
- Concept: Origin Laundering